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This essay describes an approach for designing antitrust rules for assessing whether firms 
have engaged in anticompetitive unilateral practices that is based in part on the error-cost 
framework pioneered by Judge Easterbrook. We focus particularly on the role of economic 
theory and evidence in forming presumptions about the likelihood that unilateral business 
practices reduce welfare and on the implications of this role for the kinds of research that 
economists need to conduct concerning unilateral business practices. We then apply this 
approach to tying.  
 
Our approach towards designing legal rules proceeds in two steps. First, economic theory 
and empirical evidence are used to formulate explicitly a set of presumptions regarding the cost 
and likelihood of errors resulting from condemning welfare-increasing business practices or 
condoning welfare-reducing ones. Second, based on those presumptions, a legal rule that 
minimizes the cost of errors is selected. We will refer to this as a neo-Chicago approach, since it 
accepts the fundamental tenet of Chicago thinking that legal rules and legal outcomes can and 
should be assessed based on their efficiency properties, while also incorporating the learning of 




Designing Antitrust Rules for Assessing Unilateral Practices:  A Neo-Chicago Approach 




Businesses engage in a variety of practices to increase their sales and profits often at the 
expense of competitors. These “unilateral practices” become suspect under the competition laws 
only when the firm that uses them has what is termed “monopoly power” under the laws of the 
United States and a “dominant position” under the laws of the European Union and many of its 
member states.
1 There is great variation across practices, over time, and among jurisdictions in 
how the courts analyze unilateral practices to determine whether they are anticompetitive or not. 
The courts have, for example, devised quite different rules for evaluating “low” prices over time 
and across jurisdictions. Compare LePage’s and Michelin II.
2 To take another example, plaintiffs 
face high hurdles in showing predatory pricing in the United States since Brooke Group but low 
hurdles in showing tying under Jefferson Parish.
3 
This variation results in part from the fact that the welfare-effects
4 of unilateral practices 
are inherently difficult to assess. Economics and experience provides a strong presumption that 
certain coordinated practices are generally harmful; there is thus little variation in the analysis of 
practices such as price fixing. Not so for unilateral practices. There is no basis for suggesting that 
aggressive pricing is generally bad. In fact, it is usually what society wants. But few would 
dispute that it is possible that a firm could cleverly use low prices to secure a monopoly for itself. 
Given this uncertainty it is not surprising that different courts at different times and places have 
reached different results. But this is hardly a satisfying outcome, especially since the differences 
are seldom justified in economic terms. 
                                                           
1 Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1890); Treaty of the European Communities, Official Journal C 325, 24 
December 2002. This Essay draws on United States and European competition law because these are large 
jurisdictions (together they account for almost sixty percent of the world’s industrial production) with well-
established bodies of law. IMF World Economic Outlook, 2003. 
2 LePage’s v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2003); Michelin v. Commission, Case T-203/01. 
3 Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993); Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 
2 v. Hyde, 104 S. Ct. 1551 (1984). 
4 Throughout this paper the term “welfare” refers to social welfare—the measure economists mainly advocate for 
evaluating competition policy. See, e.g., MASSIMO  MOTTA,  COMPETITION  POLICY:  THEORY AND PRACTICE 20 
(2004); Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 18 
(1968); Richard Schmalensee, Sunk Costs and Antitrust Barriers to Entry, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 471 (2004). Most of 
what we say does not depend on whether we use social welfare or the more narrow measure of consumer welfare 
that the courts and regulatory authorities typically use for evaluating antitrust issues.  
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Economic and legal scholars have suggested two major alternative approaches to the 
antitrust analysis of unilateral practices. Both of these would impose some coherency and 
consistency. Beginning in the early 1950s, the Chicago School literature argued that many 
unilateral practices should be per se legal.
5 That was based on two observations. The first was 
that many of these practices usually provided efficiencies. The second is based on what we will 
call “impossibility theorems”: these involved the application of price theory to demonstrate that 
firms with monopoly power lacked the incentives to use certain practices for anticompetitive 
purposes. 
The post-Chicago
6 literature challenged the second observation. Beginning in the early 
1980s, modern industrial organization used game theory to derive “possibility theorems” that 
showed certain behavior could be anticompetitive in particular circumstances.
7 As Kovacic and 
Shapiro observe: “Some types of conduct, such as long-term contracts with key customers or 
preemptive capacity expansion, could deter entry and entrench dominance, but they also could 
generate efficiencies. The only way to tell in a given case appeared to be for the antitrust 
agencies and the courts to conduct a full-scale rule of reason inquiry.”
8 The models, however, 
find that whether a practice increases or decreases welfare depends on specific assumptions 
being valid and model parameters taking on particular values. They do not provide much 
practical guidance when the courts or regulatory agencies get into a rule-of-reason inquiry. 
Having led us to the rule-of-reason path, the theories abandon us for the rest of what can be a 
very long journey. 
This Essay describes an approach for designing antitrust rules for assessing whether firms 
have engaged in anticompetitive unilateral practices that is based in part on the error-cost 
                                                           
5 Aaron Director is viewed by most observers as the intellectual father of the Chicago School approach to antitrust. 
See THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW (Peter Newman, ed., Macmillan Reference 
1998), at 227-33, 601-05; ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX (1978), at xv; Richard A. Posner, The 
Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PENN. L. REV. 925, 925-26 (1979). Articles from Chicago School 
proponents began appearing in the mid-1950s. See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, Vertical Integration and the Sherman Act: 
The Legal History of an Economic Misconception, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 157 (1954); Aaron Director & Edward H. 
Levi,  Law and the Future: Trade Regulation, 51 NW.  U.L.  REV. 281 (1956); Ward S. Bowman, Jr., Tying 
Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19 (1957); John S. McGee, Predatory Price Cutting: The 
Standard Oil (NJ) Case, 1 J.L. & ECON. 137 (1958); Lester G. Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade? 
3 J.L. & ECON. 86 (1960). 
6 The term “post-Chicago” was popularized by Herbert Hovenkamp and Oliver Williamson. Post-Chicago Analysis 
After Kodak: Interview with Professor Steven C. Salop, 7 ANTITRUST 20 (1992). 
7 Paul L. Joskow, Transaction Cost Economics, Antitrust Rules, and Remedies, 18 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 95, 104 
(2002).  
8 William E. Kovacic & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Policy: A Century of Economic and Legal Thinking, 14 J. ECON.  
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framework pioneered by Judge Easterbrook.
9 We focus particularly on the role of economic 
theory and evidence in forming presumptions about the likelihood that unilateral business 
practices reduce welfare and on the implications of this role for the kinds of research that 
economists need to conduct concerning unilateral business practices. We then apply this 
approach to tying.  
The approach is based on three related principles. 
 
1)  It is not possible to distinguish procompetitive from anticompetitive practices with 
certainty. Economics can provide some guidance but cannot separate the good from the 
bad with precision. 
2)  Socially desirable antitrust rules should minimize the expected cost of errors resulting 
from condoning harmful practices or condemning beneficial ones, while maintaining a 
degree of predictability for businesses and administrative ease for the courts.
10 Such rules 
would help maximize the long-run welfare generated by the competitive process. 
3)  Assessing the likelihood and cost of errors for which a legal rule is being devised for a 
particular practice requires forming a set of presumptions based on current economic 
knowledge and experience.  
 
Our approach towards designing legal rules then proceeds in two steps. First, economic 
theory and empirical evidence are used to formulate explicitly a set of presumptions regarding 
the cost and likelihood of errors resulting from condemning welfare-increasing business 
practices or condoning welfare-reducing ones. Second, based on those presumptions, a legal rule 
that minimizes the cost of errors is selected.
11 We will refer to this as a neo-Chicago approach, 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
PERSP. 43, 55 (2000). 
9 Easterbrook emphasizes the importance of presumption in structuring antitrust inquiries. He observes that the full 
rule-of-reason approach is often impractical and advocates a more structured rule of reason. We specify a two-state 
decision theoretic approach and make use of derive the presumptions in light of existing theory and empirical 
evidence. Our approach can yield modified per se legality rules for unilateral practices. See Frank H. Easterbrook, 
The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1984).  
10 This error-cost approach has been applied to legal rules generally as well as antitrust in particular. See, e.g., 
Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399, 
400 (1973); Easterbrook, supra note 9. For recent applications see C. Frederick Beckner III & Steven C. Salop, 
Decision Theory and Antitrust Rules, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 41 (1999); Keith N. Hylton & Michael Salinger, Tying Law 
and Policy: A Decision-Theoretic Approach, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 469 (2001). 
11 Formally, this approach relies on a Bayesian decision-theoretic framework. There is a “prior distribution” on 
possible market outcomes. Error costs are minimized subject to this prior distribution. See Hylton & Salinger, supra  
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since it accepts the fundamental tenet of Chicago thinking that legal rules and legal outcomes can 
and should be assessed based on their efficiency properties,
12 while also incorporating the 
learning of the Chicago and post-Chicago literatures in designing these rules.  
We begin by briefly summarizing the evolution of economic thinking on the competitive 
character of unilateral behavior and its effect on how courts and competition authorities consider 
those antitrust issues. We then describe the methodology proposed in this Essay along with 
several pragmatic aspects of how this approach could be implemented in practice to the 
assessment of unilateral practices. We apply this neo-Chicago approach to tying—one of the 
more unsettled areas of antitrust law concerning unilateral practices. 
 
2. Unilateral Practices: From Pre- to Post-Chicago 
 
The “pre-Chicago approach” refers to judgments concerning business practices that are 
not based on an economic analysis of whether firms with market power have the incentive or 
ability to engage in such practices for anticompetitive reasons. These judgments typically fail to 
consider whether, and to what extent, those business practices result from procompetitive efforts 
to achieve efficiencies. The pre-Chicago approach, instead, is based on what might best be 
described as “intuitions” about whether practices are nefarious or not. The Supreme Court used 
this intuitive approach in many cases that examined unilateral practices in the first three quarters 
of the twentieth century—a period that is sometimes called the pre-Chicago era in antitrust.
13 
One of the major pre-Chicago contributions is the so-called “leverage doctrine,”
14 which 
is behind a number of decisions that condemned various unilateral practices when used by firms 
with significant market power. Starting with Terminal Railroads, the courts seemed to believe 
that a firm with a monopoly in one market, call it M, has always an incentive to extend that 
monopoly to a market for a complementary product, call it C, and thereby get two monopoly 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
note 10; Beckner & Salop, supra note 10.  
12 NICHOLAS MERCURO AND STEVEN G. MEDEMA, ECONOMICS AND THE LAW: FROM POSNER TO POST-MODERNISM 
(1997) at 57.  
13 As we shall see, the fact that the pre-Chicago views were not based on rigorous economic analysis does not mean 
they were necessarily wrong. The post-Chicago economic literature discussed below can be viewed as an attempt to 
show that some of the business practices condemned by the pre-Chicago courts could have been anticompetitive 
given the right set of facts. 
14 See, e.g., Bowman, supra note 5.  
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profits instead of one.
15 Following this reasoning the courts found that several types of unilateral 
practices should be illegal per se.
 One concern was that a monopolist would tie the purchase of 
its monopoly product to other competitive products in order to extend its monopoly power to 
previously competitive markets. Tying was therefore illegal per se.
16 Another broad concern was 
that a manufacturer would use vertical agreements with its distributors to extend a monopoly to 
the downstream market. This belief led to per se illegality for resale price maintenance,
17 
exclusive territories,
18 and exclusive dealing.
19 
Another significant pre-Chicago view was that firms could use predatory actions to drive 
rivals out of the market, thereby creating a monopoly position for the predator.
20 For example, a 
large firm could set low, predatory prices so that its competitors would lose money and exit. 
Predatory pricing was considered under the rule of reason, but courts were free to apply reason 
as they thought best, and many defendants lost.
21  
 
The Chicago School 
The Chicago School made a significant contribution to antitrust by applying basic price 
theory to a variety of practices that were viewed suspiciously by the courts. The most famous is 
the “single monopoly profit theorem.” In a vertical chain of production there is a single 
monopoly profit to be had. A firm that has a monopoly at one level of the vertical chain can 
secure that if it charges a monopoly price for its product and everyone else charges a competitive 
price for theirs’. It would then prefer to have as much competition as possible at every other level 
of the chain because that will reduce the price of the final product, increase sales, and thereby 
                                                           
15 United States v. Terminal Railroad Association, 224 U.S. 383 (1912). 
16 International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947). As we discuss in more detail below, tying is 
now treated under a rule of quasi per se illegality. 
17 Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911). Following Dr. Miles, legislative action 
made resale price maintenance under certain circumstances. All resale price maintenance again became per se illegal 
in 1975 when these laws were repealed. DENNIS  W.  CARLTON  &  JEFFREY  M.  PERLOFF,  MODERN  INDUSTRIAL 
ORGANIZATION 635-41 (3d ed. 1999). As discussed below, the Court recently removed the per se prohibition on 
maximum resale price maintenance. 
18 Exclusive territories were initially analyzed under rule of reason, such as in White Motor but subsequently found 
per se illegal under Schwinn. White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963); United States v. Arnold 
Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967). As discussed below, Schwinn was itself subsequently overruled by Sylvania. 
19 A showing that some threshold share of the relevant market has been affected is also required, although that share 
does not have to be high. Exclusive contracts about 1 percent of the relevant market was insufficient to trigger 
liability in Tampa Electric, but a share of 16 percent was sufficient in Standard Stations. Tampa Electric Co. v. 
Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949). 
20 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). 
21 See, e.g., John S. McGee, Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N.J.) Case, 1 J.L. & ECON. 137 (1958).  
 
6
maximize the total profit that it receives. This theorem is fatal, or so it appeared, to the leverage 
doctrine. The monopoly has no incentive to monopolize competitive levels of the chain because 
it can never get more profit than it currently obtains from having a monopoly at one level.
22 
Variants of the single monopoly profit theorem have been applied to tying, essential facilities, 
and, more broadly, to the analysis of vertical integration and restraints.
23 
 Much has been written on the influence of the Chicago School on modern antitrust.
24 
The Chicago School’s arguments, including the single monopoly profit theorem, have made 
significant inroads in the Supreme Court’s treatment of vertical restraints. One of the earliest 
Chicago-influenced decisions, Sylvania, overruled precedent and analyzed territorial restraints 
imposed by manufacturers on distributors under the rule of reason, rather than finding them 
illegal per se.
25 More recently, the Court has overturned the per se prohibition on maximum 
resale price maintenance—a manufacturer’s setting of a maximum price that their distributors 
can charge.
26 (The setting of a minimum retail price by manufacturers is, however, still illegal 
per se.) Another significant Chicago contribution is in the treatment of predatory pricing claims. 
The Chicago School thinking influenced Supreme Court decisions that have made predatory 
pricing claims difficult for plaintiffs to pursue.
27 The courts have therefore gone in the direction 
desired by the Chicago School—and the period after Sylvania is sometimes described as the 
“Chicago era” in antitrust—although not for all practices considered by the Chicago School or as 
                                                           
22 In fact the monopolist has an incentive to destroy market power at other levels of the chain. A second monopoly 
for example would result in a higher price for the final product and reduce its sales. This result, known unhelpfully 
as double marginalization, dates back to Cournot in 1838. AUGUSTIN  A.  COURNOT,  RESEARCHES INTO THE 
MATHEMATICAL PRINCIPLES OF THE THEORY OF WEALTH (R.D. Irwin 1986) (1838). 
23 BORK, supra note 5, at 195-201. 
24 See, e.g., Posner, supra note 5; Kovacic & Shapiro, supra note 8; Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After 
Chicago, 84 MICH. L. REV. 213 (1985); POST-CHICAGO DEVELOPMENTS IN ANTITRUST LAW (Antonio Cucinotta et 
al., eds., 2002); INGO L.O. SCHMIDT & JAN B. RITTALER, A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OF 
ANTITRUST  ANALYSIS  (1989); Edmund W. Kitch, The Fire of Truth: Remembrance of Law and Economics at 
Chicago, 1932-1970, J.L. & ECON. 163 (1983); Michael S. Jacobs, An Essay on the Normative Foundations of 
Antitrust Economics, 74 N.C.L. REV. 219 (1995); Melvin W. Reder, Chicago Economics: Permanence and Change, 
20 J. ECON. LIT. 1 (1982); Alan J. Meese, Tying Meets the New Institutional Economics: Farewell to the Chimera of 
Forcing, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1997); William H. Page, The Chicago School and the Evolution of Antitrust: 
Characterization, Antitrust Injury, and Evidentiary Sufficiency, 75 VA. L. REV. 1221 (1989); Herbert Hovenkamp, 
Post-Chicago Antitrust: A Review and Critique, 2001 COLUM.  BUS.  L.  REV. 257 (2001); Christopher S. Yoo, 
Vertical Integration and Media Regulation in the New Economy, 19 YALE J. ON REG. 171, 187-205 (2002). 
25 Continental T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36 (1977). 
26 State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997). 
27 See, e.g., United States v. AMR Corp., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1141 (D. Kan. 2001), aff’d, 335 F.3d 1109 (10th Cir. 
2003); Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993). The development of the 
Areeda-Turner test for predatory pricing, which severely limited successful predatory pricing claims in the United 
States, was also influenced by the Chicago School. See Kitch, supra note 24, at 209.  
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far as the Chicago School advocated. 
 
Post-Chicago Ideas and Models 
In the 1980s, some economists started kicking the tires on the Chicago results. They 
found that it was possible to develop models in which firms could use their monopoly in one 
market to affect adjacent markets in ways that reduced social welfare and therefore might be 
deemed anticompetitive.
28 Michael Whinston’s article on tying is a seminal paper in that strand 
of the literature.
29 He locates some assumptions under which a monopoly has incentives to tie its 
monopoly product to a secondary product in order to eliminate competition in the secondary 
market. More precisely, he shows that leveraging a monopoly position in the tying market onto 
an adjacent tied market may be privately profitable when the tied market is subject to economies 
of scale and, therefore, is imperfectly competitive, and when leveraging successfully induces the 
exit, or deters the entry, of competitors in the tied market.
30 Subsequent articles by other 
economists identified other sets of assumptions under which monopolies had both the incentive 
and ability to foreclose competition in a secondary market either to attain an additional 
monopoly profit there or to protect their monopoly profit in the primary market.
31 Likewise, 
another strand of the modern economics literature undercut the proposition that firms lacked the 
incentive or ability to engage in predatory pricing.
32 
The post-Chicago approach had an impact on both U.S. and European antitrust. In the 
United States, it received a limited Supreme Court imprimatur in Kodak. On review of summary 
judgment dismissing the claim that the defendant used its position in the market for photocopier 
                                                           
28 The models focus on social welfare and not consumer welfare. All of the models with which we are familiar show 
that unilateral actions by monopolists can reduce social welfare in the short-term under certain conditions. This 
result requires that the decline in the welfare of competitors exceed the positive impact of those actions on consumer 
welfare in the short-term. Hence, a decrease in social welfare in the short-term does not necessarily imply a decrease 
in long-run consumer welfare. Therefore, these models are useful for assessing the effect on social welfare, the 
measure that economists prefer, but not for assessing the effect on consumer welfare, the measure that courts and 
regulatory agencies have adopted.  
29 Michael D. Whinston, Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 837 (1990). 
30 Whinston is careful to observe the limited practical use of these results. “Even in the simple models considered 
here, which ignore a number of other possible motivations for the practice, the impact of this exclusion on welfare is 
uncertain. This fact, combined with the difficulty of sorting out the leverage-based instances of tying from other 
cases, makes the specification of a practical legal standard extremely difficult.” Whinston, supra note 29, at 855-56. 
31 See Jay Pil Choi & Christodoulos Stefanadis, Tying, Investment, and the Dynamic Leverage Theory, 32 RAND J. 
ECON. 52 (2001); Dennis W. Carlton & Michael Waldman, The Strategic Use of Tying to Preserve and Create 
Market Power in Evolving Industries, 33 RAND J. ECON. 194 (2002).  
32 See, e.g., JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION (1988), at ch. 9. See also, Patrick Bolton, 
Joseph F. Brodley, & Michael H. Riordan, Predatory Pricing: Strategic Theory and Legal Policy, 88 GEO. L.J.  
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parts and micrographics equipment to monopolize the market for servicing these machines, the 
Court found that it was possible that a firm could use its dominant position with respect to its 
locked-in customers to monopolize a derivative aftermarket.
33 The plaintiffs in the case had 
relied on an economist who presented arguments that follow the post-Chicago literature.
34 In 
effect, the Court rejected the per se legal approach that would follow from the Chicago School in 
favor of a rule-of-reason approach that would consider the possibility of anticompetitive 
behavior in the particular factual circumstances of the case.
35 The U.S. Department of Justice 
relied on post-Chicago approaches in two well-known cases it initiated in the late 1990s.
36 In 
Microsoft III, it argued that Microsoft had promoted its own browsing software for the purpose 
of deterring a challenge to its operating system monopoly. That line of argument prevailed with 
the district court and, to an extent, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals.
37 The economic subtext for 
this case can be found in an article, in the post-Chicago tradition, by Dennis Carlton and Michael 
Waldman.
38 In American Airlines, the Justice Department pressed a post-Chicago predatory 
pricing theory
39 that was rejected, on summary judgment, by the District Court and the Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals.
40 
The European Commission has relied on post-Chicago arguments in several well-known 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
2239, 2250-51 (2000). 
33 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Serv. Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992). 
34 Stephen Calkins, Supreme Court Antitrust 1991-92: The Revenge of the Amici, 61 ANTITRUST L.J. 269, n.183 
(1993). 
35 Kodak has had a limited effect even in aftermarket cases. One commentator states that “there has not been a single 
defensible plaintiff’s victory in a case where the defendant’s market power depended on a Kodak-style lock-in 
theory” and that “the lower courts have bent over backwards to construe Kodak as narrowly as possible.” Herbert 
Hovenkamp,  The Reckoning of Post-Chicago Antitrust,  in P OST-CHICAGO  DEVELOPMENTS IN ANTITRUST  LAW 
(Antonio Cucinotta et al., eds., 2002), at 8. The initial view that Kodak would usher in an era in which the courts 
followed adopted the post-Chicago view ignored the fact that the Court was only looking at summary judgment. 
36 Kovacic & Shapiro, supra note 8, at 57-58. 
37 United States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001). The D.C. Circuit accepted the basic argument that 
Microsoft tied a browser to the operating system to prevent nascent competition that could threaten Microsoft’s 
operating system monopoly. However, it remanded the tying claim (whose effect was on the tied market rather than 
the tying market) for reconsideration under a rule-of-reason analysis (having rejected the Jefferson Parish approach 
for the case of software platforms). 
38 Carlton & Waldman, supra note 31. This model was not presented at trial. Carlton was, however, a consultant to 
Sun and made presentations on its behalf to the Justice Department, providing an outline of the type of suit Sun 
believed the government should file against Microsoft. JOHN HEILEMAN, PRIDE BEFORE THE FALL: THE TRIALS OF 
BILL GATES AND THE END OF THE MICROSOFT ERA 88-94 (2003).  
39 As academic support the Justice Department cited, for example, the post-Chicago theories discussed in Patrick 
Bolton, Joseph F. Brodley & Michael H. Riordan, Predatory Pricing: Strategic Theory and Legal Policy, 88 GEO. 
L.J. 2239 (2000). See Brief for the Appellant United States of America, United States v. AMR Corp., 335 F.3d 1109 
(10th Cir. 2003) (No. 01-3202) (public redacted version); Reply Brief for the Appellant United States of America, 
United States v. AMR Corp., 335 F.3d 1109 (10th Cir. 2003) (No. 01-3202) (public redacted version).  
40 United States v. AMR Corp., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1141 (D. Kan. 2001), aff’d, 335 F.3d 1109 (10th Cir. 2003).  
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merger control cases in the last several years.
41 The Commission blocked a merger between 
Tetra Laval, the leading (and according to the Commission dominant) supplier of drink carton 
packaging equipment and Sidel, the leading (but not allegedly dominant) maker of machines 
used in the production of plastic bottles. The Commission expressed concern over, among other 
things, “conglomerate effects” resulting from the merger. It argued that, for example, the 
combined entity would have the ability and incentive to use its existing dominance of Tetra 
Laval in carton packaging “as a ‘lever’ in order to achieve a dominant position on the [plastic 
bottle] equipment markets.”
42 On appeal, the Court of First Instance accepted the possibility of 
such conglomerate effects but that the Commission had failed to show that such anticompetitive 
effects were likely given the facts of the case. Similar arguments were relied on in the 
Commission’s decision to block the merger of General Electric and Honeywell.
43 It remains to 
be seen how these theories will ultimately fare in the European courts.  
The post-Chicago literature is a collection of what we have termed “possibility 
theorems.”
44 In the vertical foreclosure strand of the literature, these theorems all begin with the 
“simplifying” assumption that the practice in question does not generate any benefits such as 
reduction in production costs, lower transaction costs, or improved convenience for consumers.
45 
The theorems are based on further assumptions about demand, costs, and how firms strategically 
                                                           
41 In addition, the Commission’s decision finding that Microsoft had abused its dominant position by allegedly tying 
its media player to its operating system was based on a theory that we would put in the post-Chicago tradition. The 
Commission found, “In a nutshell, tying WMP with the dominant Windows makes WMP the platform of choice for 
complementary content and applications which in turn risks foreclosing competition in the market for media players. 
This has spillover effects on competition in related products such as media encoding and management software 
(often server-side), but also in client PC operating systems for which media players compatible with quality content 
are an important application.” See Commission Decision of 24.03.2004, Case COMP/C-3/37.792, available at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/cases/decisions/37792/en.pdf, at ¶842.This argument echoes an 
economic literature that shows that under some assumptions markets can tip and that firms can engage in 
anticompetitive actions to make markets tip to themselves and thereby establish a monopoly. See, e.g., W. Brian 
Arthur, Competing Technologies and Lock-In by Historical Events, 99 ECON. J. 116 (1989). 
42 Tetra Laval BV v. Commission, Case T-5/02, 2002 E.C.R. II-4381, at ¶143. 
43 General Electric and Honeywell have appealed that decision. Honeywell Int’l v. Commission, Case T-209/01; 
General Electric Co. v. Commission, Case T-210/01. The Commission apparently relied on the post-Chicago models 
developed for some of the complainants by Jay Phil Choi (See Stefan Schmitz, The European Commission’s 
Decision in GE/Honeywell and the Question of the Goals of Antitrust Law, 23:3 U. Pa. J. Int’l Econ. L., 539, YEAR 
at 578-9) and Janusz A. Ordover (See Robert J Reynolds & Janusz A. Ordover, Archimedean Leveraging and the 
GE/Honeywell Transaction, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. (2002). 
44 Joskow, supra note 7.  
45 Making such extreme assumptions to focus on a particular issue is standard in economics. Moreover, the authors 
are careful to note that it is not possible to use the models to craft antitrust policy. Whinston, supra note 29; Carlton 
& Waldman, supra note 31.Unfortunately, economists and regulatory authorities sometimes ignore these caveats. 
See, e.g., European Regulators Group, Draft Joint ERG/EC Approach on Appropriate Remedies in the New 
Regulatory Framework, November 2003.  
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interact with each other. Finally, the theorems show that the practice reduces social welfare when 
certain parameters of the model (these might relate to the elasticity of demand, the magnitude of 
fixed costs, or the shape of the cost curve) take a particular range of values. 
These models provide valuable insights but are of limited use in many cases. It is often 
impossible to use data, or other evidence, to confirm the assumptions that underlie those models 
or to assess whether their “critical” parameters do, indeed, fall in the range of values required for 
the practice to reduce social welfare. These models tell us that it is conceivable, as a matter of 
theory, that a practice is anticompetitive in the sense that it raises the profit of the firm engaging 
in that practice at the expense of society.  
 
Implications for the Design of Antitrust Rules 
The Chicago and post-Chicago literatures have relied on economic theory to question the 
intuitions of the pre-Chicago approach. Both literatures emphasize efficiency as the ultimate 
criterion for the design of antitrust rules and reject most pre-Chicago per se illegality rules 
concerning unilateral practices. Yet where the Chicago School tended to advocate per se legality, 
post-Chicago thinking enthuses over rule-of-reason analyses. The post-Chicago literature has 
shown that the economic propositions resulting from both Chicago and post-Chicago models are 
theoretical possibilities; they depend on assumptions that may or may not hold true in any 
particular case and which are hard to test given the current state of empirical knowledge. We are 
thus left with a fair amount of economic indeterminacy.  
Where do we go from here? For some the solution is more game theory.
46 So far, 
however, years of work using this approach have failed to provide any of the practical guidance 
the courts need to weigh anticompetitive and procompetitive effects in a rule-of-reason analysis. 
We see no reason to believe this will change. Others have confidence that the rule-of-reason 
approach allows juries, courts, and regulators to discern the right answer for the matter at hand. 
But as Benjamin Franklin once said, “So convenient a thing it is to be a reasonable Creature, 
since it enables one to find or make a Reason for every thing one has a mind to do.”
47        
 
                                                           
46 Kovacic & Shapiro, supra note 8. 
47 BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, WRITINGS 1339 (1987).  
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2. Unilateral Practices: A Neo-Chicago Approach 
 
Competition policy will inevitably make mistakes. The vagaries of the judicial process, 
the fact that evidence is seldom as clear as one would like, and human fallibility make errors 
inevitable in all areas of the law. But the usual problems are compounded for unilateral practices 
by the lack of robust economic guidance. Firms will thus get away with anticompetitive practices 
if competition policy is too lenient, and they will be discouraged from engaging in 
procompetitive practices if it is too strict. Sound competition policy must begin with an 
assessment, based on economic theory and evidence, of how likely and costly such mistakes are. 
It must then devise administrable legal rules that minimize the expected costs of these errors and 
make antitrust enforcement predictable for businesses. These are precisely the two stages of the 
neo-Chicago methodology proposed in this paper, as described in the introductory section. 
To implement this approach for the assessment of the unilateral behavior of firms with 
market power, we first formulate three presumptions—or, in the language of Bayesian decision-
making, we state three prior beliefs—regarding the nature, cost and likelihood of the errors 
resulting from the assessment. These presumptions or prior beliefs are independent of the facts of 
any specific case. However, they affect how we process the evidence in each specific case and 
how we want to establish burdens of proof and ultimately the degree of antitrust scrutiny. Then, 
based on those presumptions, we proceed to select a legal rule that, while easy to administer and 
enforce, minimizes the cost of those errors. 
We hold three presumptions.  
 
1)  Many unilateral practices that have raised concerns are also widely used in competitive 
markets and therefore presumably result in efficiencies for firms or consumers.  
2)  The impossibility theorems developed by the Chicago School are likely to be close to the 
truth in many real world markets, since market forces generally prevent unilateral 
anticompetitive strategies, such as predatory pricing and monopoly leveraging, from 
being profitable in the long term.  
3)  Condemning procompetitive practices is likely to be more costly than exonerating 




In the next three sections we explain the economic reasons supporting these three 
presumptions. We then consider their implications for the design of legal rules. 
 
Prior Beliefs about Efficiency  
Consider a practice in which firms in both competitive and uncompetitive markets 
engage. We would expect that the practice cut costs or enhanced value to consumers—after all, 
competitive firms cannot survive indefinitely if they do not use the most efficient methods of 
producing, designing and distributing products. 
Many unilateral practices that are challenged under the antitrust laws are ones that non-
dominant firms engage in regularly. These include tying,
48 vertical restraints such as exclusive 
contracts and exclusive territories,
49 nonlinear pricing including loyalty discounts,
50 and 
aggressive price-cutting.
51 There is no reason to believe that practices that generate efficiencies 
when firms lack market power do not generate those same efficiencies when firms possess 
market power. For these practices, therefore, our prior is that firms are generally engaging in 
them because it is efficient, and therefore procompetitive, for them to do so. That said, and as we 
show in the case of tying, economists do not understand these sources of efficiencies well at the 
moment and it is difficult to document them persuasively. It is also not surprising that business 
people have difficulty documenting and sometimes even articulating these efficiencies. 
Consequently, the courts should provide some deference to efficiency explanations offered for 
unilateral practices that are common in competitive markets. That may entail imposing the 
burden of proof on the plaintiff to demonstrate that the efficiencies are not significant or are 
simply being offered as a pretext by the defendant.
52  
 
                                                           
48 David S. Evans & Michael A. Salinger, Why Do Firms Bundle and Tie? Evidence from Competitive Markets and 
Implications for Tying Law, YALE J. ON REG. (forthcoming); Paul Seabright, Tying and Bundling: From Economics 
to Competition Policy, Edited Transcript of a CNE Market Insights Event, Sept. 19, 2002, at 
http://www.cne.org/pub_pdf/2002_09_19_tying_bundling.htm. 
49 Jan B. Heide, Shantanu Dutta, & Mark Bergen, Exclusive Dealing and Business Efficiency: Evidence From 
Industry Practice, 41 J.L. & ECON. 387, 404 (1998).  
50 John Temple Lang & Robert O’Donoghue, Defining Legitimate Competition: How to Clarify Pricing Abuses 
Under Article 82 EC, 26 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 83, 91 (2002). See also, ROBERT B. WILSON, NONLINEAR PRICING 
(1993), at ch. 1-2. 
51 MOTTA, supra note 4, at 443. 
52 Evidence of significant consumer harm from a practice can help reduce the likelihood of false convictions, 
without significant attendant increases in false acquittals, and should be part of any legal rule. See Howard H. 
Chang, David S. Evans & Richard Schmalensee, Has the Consumer Harm Standard Lost its Teeth?,  in H IGH  
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Prior Beliefs on Anticompetitive Intent and Effect  
The principal implication of several decades of economic investigation on the 
competitive effects of unilateral practices such as exclusive dealing and tying is that there should 
be no presumption on the part of competition authorities that these practices are anticompetitive, 
even when undertaken by firms with monopoly power.
53 Firms with the ability  to cause 
consumer harm do not often have an incentive  to do so. Anticompetitive actions aimed at 
excluding competitors from adjacent markets to achieve monopoly power often result in a 
reduction of overall firm profits. Firms with the incentive to act anticompetitively do not often 
have the ability to do so, either because they do not have the ability to pre-commit to an 
anticompetitive course of action or because they cannot extract any anticompetitive rents due to 
the countervailing power of buyers and/or potential entrants. 
There is no basis, therefore, for assuming without further evidence that a firm is engaging 
in such practices for the purpose of maintaining or acquiring a monopoly. And there is no reason 
to believe that, even if its intent were anticompetitive, it would have the ability to harm 
consumers or lower welfare by reducing competition. We discuss these observations further 
below for the specific case of tying. 
 
Prior Beliefs on Error Costs 
With these prior beliefs in mind let us turn to an analysis of error costs. Table 1 shows the 
standard error matrix with the shaded boxes reflecting the two possible errors that enforcement 
agencies and the judicial system can make: falsely condemning competitive practices (“false 
convictions”) and falsely absolving anticompetitive practices (“false acquittals”).
54 We believe 
that the costs of false convictions in antitrust decisions involving unilateral practices are likely to 
be significantly larger than those of false acquittals. As Judge Easterbrook wrote, “the economic 
system corrects monopoly more readily than it corrects judicial errors. There is no automatic way 
to expunge mistaken decisions of the Supreme Court. A practice once condemned is likely to 
stay condemned, no matter its benefits. A monopolistic practice wrongly excused will eventually 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
STAKES ANTITRUST: THE LAST HURRAH? (Robert W. Hahn ed., 2003). 
53 See, inter alia, Michael D. Whinston, Exclusivity and Tying in U.S. v. Microsoft: What We Know and What We 
Don’t Know, 15 J. ECON. PERSP. 63 (2001); Patrick Rey, Paul Seabright, & Jean Tirole, The Activities of a Monopoly 
Firm in Adjacent Competitive Markets: Economic Consequences and Implications for Competition Policy, IDEI 
mimeo (2001), at http://idei.fr/doc/wp/2001/activities_abs.pdf. 
54 We borrow the colorful acquittal/conviction terminology from the criminal context, even though it is technically  
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yield to competition, though, as the monopolist’s higher prices attract rivalry.”
55  
That is, if an anticompetitive business practice is mistakenly permitted, the very 
monopoly profits flowing from that practice attract aggressive competition and new entrants. 
Market forces play no such general corrective role for procompetitive business practices found 
anticompetitive.
56 And by restraining legitimate acts, antitrust laws would reduce the value of 
being a legitimate market leader, which is the goal that drives innovation. 
 
Design of Legal Rules 
Let us define a spectrum of plausible legal rules or standards for finding that behavior is 
anticompetitive that ranges from weak to strong. A weaker standard is one that makes it easier to 
establish that a practice is anticompetitive and therefore decreases the percentage of false 
acquittals and increases the percentage of false convictions. Error costs vary as we move across 
this spectrum. The social objective is to find the rule on this spectrum that minimizes the 
expected cost of these errors. This cost is given by the likelihood of error and the social cost of 
each type of error. 
Consider first how legal rules can be designed to minimize the likelihood of error. The 
total proportion of cases that are erroneously decided is the sum of the percentages in the top 
right and lower left boxes in Table 1. Now, consider the implications of our presumptions for 
choosing a legal rule. Our priors tell us that practices, such as tying or exclusive dealing, that are 
commonly used by competitive firms as well as by firms with market power, are generally 
procompetitive. This means that most cases involving such practices belong in the bottom row 
(i.e., not harmful to competition). In this situation, it is better, all else equal, to choose a stricter 
standard, lowering the rate of false convictions, while accepting an increase in the rate of false 
acquittals. Intuitively, if most of the cases involve permissible business practices, the error rate in 
evaluating those cases is more important, as they result in a greater number of errors.
57 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
incorrect. 
55 Easterbrook, supra note 10, at 15. 
56 Firms are likely to be reluctant to implement alternative businesses practices that replicate the one found 
anticompetitive, as such practices are likely to also be found anticompetitive. 
57 A numerical example may be instructive. Suppose there are 40 cases that involve permissible practices and 20 
cases that involve anticompetitive practices. And suppose that the error rate for both types of cases is 10 percent at 
the existing legal standard. There will thus be on average 4 false convictions (10 percent of 40) and 2 false acquittals 
(10 percent of 20), for a total of 6 erroneously decided cases. Suppose we can move to a stricter standard that lowers 
the error rate in assessing permissible practices to 5 percent while increasing the error rate in assessing 
anticompetitive practices to 15 percent. (The error rates for false convictions and false acquittals do not, of course,  
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Another important factor in deciding on the right legal standard in an error cost 
framework is the social cost of a false conviction versus that of a false acquittal. (Implicitly, we 
assumed that they were the same in the numerical example above.) It is socially desirable, all 
else equal, to decrease those errors that are more costly. When the social cost of false convictions 
is large relative to that of false acquittals, as our presumptions imply, error-cost minimization 
requires a stricter standard. 
Given our presumptions on efficiencies, anticompetitive intent and effects, and on error 
costs, the legal rule that minimizes the expected cost of false convictions and acquittals will 
necessarily involve significant evidentiary hurdles prior to establishing that a unilateral practice 
undertaken by a firm with market power is anticompetitive. In practice, this rule can be 
implemented through a series of screens based on the findings of the economic literature.  
Although modern economics has not identified all necessary and sufficient conditions for 
any unilateral practice to be anticompetitive, it has been better at determining the necessary 
conditions.
58 Those conditions can be used to screen out practices that could not be 
anticompetitive, because the necessary conditions do not hold. When one of those necessary 
conditions fails, we can assume that the practice is not suspect.  
If all those conditions are met, we still have to balance anticompetitive and 
procompetitive effects in a final stage prior to concluding that the practice is anticompetitive 
overall. Indeed, as we showed above, for unilateral practices it is important to consider 
efficiencies in the analysis. A proper inquiry into efficiencies can be time consuming and is 
accordingly best done only for those practices that pass through the earlier screens. For example, 
if a defendant lacks significant market power, economic theory says that it lacks the ability to 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
necessarily trade off one-to-one as we change the legal rule. The example offered here is for illustrative purposes.) Is 
this worthwhile? The number of false convictions decreases to 2 (5 percent of 40) while the number of false 
acquittals increases to 3 (15 percent of 20), for a total of 5 errors, or 1 fewer than before. We have thereby decreased 
the total number of errors by moving to a stricter standard because we lowered the error rate for those practices that 
are most common. 
 We have greatly simplified the analysis here for expositional purposes. Table 1 is presented in terms of outcomes of 
litigated cases. A more comprehensive analysis would have to also consider “errors” that do not get to court—there 
will be harmless practices that firms do not engage in for fear of antitrust liability under the prevailing legal 
standard, as well as harmful practices not litigated because potential plaintiffs do not believe their expected gain 
from litigation to be positive under the prevailing legal standard. On a related note, we have to recognize that the 
behavior of firms may change as legal rules change. Moving to a stricter legal standard may encourage more 
anticompetitive behavior. For example, literal per se legality may result in firms undertaking new forms of 
anticompetitive behavior that would easily be identified as anticompetitive if litigated. 
58 In our experience, economists and regulators often use post-Chicago reasoning to motivate an anticompetitive 
claim but then ignore the necessary conditions the flow from the post-Chicago literature.  
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exclude competitors and cause consumer harm, so we should end the inquiry there. Similarly, if a 
defendant’s tying arrangements or exclusive contracts do not actually foreclose competitors from 
competing, anticompetitive effects are also unlikely. Again, the inquiry should be terminated. 
Because analyzing market power or examining the degree of foreclosure are, compared to 
addressing efficiencies, much more amenable the standard tools available to economists, they 
should be the basis for safe harbors to be considered before addressing efficiencies. 
  The “predatory pricing test” prevailing in the United States since Brooke Group is 
structured along these lines. Two screens are applied. First, are the challenged prices below a 
reasonable measure of the seller’s costs? Second, is there a “reasonable prospect, or, under §2 of 
the Sherman Act, a dangerous probability, of recouping its investment in below-cost prices”?
59 It 
is important to recognize that the approach proposed in this Essay does not pretend that this test 
will detect all possible price predation. Rather, relying on an error-cost approach, it takes the 
position that that it is better to err on the side of letting some predatory pricing through rather 
than condemning some competitive pricing. Because setting low prices is the hallmark of 
competition (so that the cost of falsely condemning legitimate price cutting is high) and because 
successful predation is rare (so that the likelihood of false acquittals is low), the Supreme Court 
has properly moved to a stricter standard for showing predation. 
The European Court of Justice’s “exceptional circumstances test” in Magill and IMS 
Health  is also structured this way. Compulsory licensing is imposed only if four necessary 
conditions are satisfied: (1) the intellectual property is indispensable for firms to compete in a 
secondary market; (2) the failure to license that intellectual property results in the elimination of 
all competition on that secondary market; (3) the intellectual property is needed to produce a new 
product for which there is likely consumer demand; and (4) there is no objective justification for 
the refusal.
60 We have argued elsewhere that these conditions isolate compulsory licensing to 
those situations in which the prospective social benefits of licensing are so large that they offset 
the negative and widespread effects of reducing the incentives to create intellectual property.
61 
                                                           
59 Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993).  
60 Order of the President of the Court of First Instance (Oct. 26, 2001), case T-184/01 R, IMS Health v. 
Commission, 2001 E.C.R. II-3193, at ¶103, available at  
http://europa.eu.int/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexplus!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=en&numdoc=62001B0184(
01). See Christian Ahlborn, David S. Evans & A. Jorge Padilla, When Is There an Obligation to Deal under the 
Competition Laws: Recent Developments in the United States and Europe, Working Paper (February 2004). 
61 See Ahlborn et al., supra note 60, at 12. The Supreme Court also seems to have moved to a modified per se 
legality standard for the refusal to share property. Verizon Communications v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 124  
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Both the “predatory pricing test” and the “exceptional circumstances test” can be viewed 
as what we term “modified per se legality” rules. The practices (pricing low, refusing to license a 
competitor) are presumed to be legal even for firms with significant market power. They are 
found illegal only if the plaintiff can clear relatively high hurdles. Not surprisingly, there have 
been no successful prosecutions of predatory pricing claims in the United States since Brooke 




3. Implications for Tying Doctrine 
 
Tying refers to the practice of requiring customers to take one product in order to get 
another. It was originally treated as a per se offense in the United States. Justice Frankfurter, in 
an early decision that epitomizes the pre-Chicago approach, said that tying agreements “serve 
hardly any purpose beyond the suppression of competition.”
63 The Supreme Court came close to 
backing away from that maxim in its Jefferson Parish decision in 1984. Four justices advocated 
applying the rule of reason but the majority tepidly rejected that approach, noting “It is far too 
late in the history of our antitrust jurisprudence to question the proposition that certain tying 
arrangements pose an unacceptable risk of stifling competition and therefore are unreasonable 
‘per se.’”
64 Instead it required that a tying allegation pass through several screens before being 
considered per se illegal. This is an example of a modified per se illegality standard. Tying is 
also an abuse of dominance under Article 82 of the EC Treaty. The European approach is similar 
in many respects to that in the United States, and we treat them as the same for the purposes of 
our discussion.
65 
The courts and enforcement agencies have never taken Justice Frankfurter’s 
condemnation literally.
66 If they did, the courts would be deluged with cases, and the economy 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
S.Ct. 872 (2004). 
62 Radio Telefis Eireann and Independent Television Publications Ltd. v. Commission (1 June 1994), Joined Cases 
C-241/91P and C-242/91P. The plaintiff prevailed in Magill in part because the Court viewed the intellectual 
property rights to be highly questionable, under the laws of most member states, in that case.  
63 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305 (1949). 
64 Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 104 S. Ct. 1551, 1556 (1984). 
65 See David S. Evans, A. Jorge Padilla & Christian Ahlborn, The Antitrust Economics of Tying: A Farewell to Per 
Se Illegality, ANTITRUST BULL. (forthcoming). 
66 For an overview of the Supreme Court’s positions towards tying cases throughout the past century, see Victor H. 
Kramer, The Supreme Court and Tying Arrangements: Antitrust as History, 69 MINN. L. REV. 1013 (1985).  
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would grind to a halt. Tying is pervasive and there is seldom a principled basis, as we discuss 
below, for distinguishing ties that fail the tests that implement the modified per se illegality 
standard prevailing in the United States and the European Union from the ones that are never 
challenged.  
Yet tying is a potent allegation and the finding of a tying violation can have profound 
economic effects. In April 2003, for instance, MasterCard and Visa settled an antitrust case in 
which a certified class of about 5 million merchants claimed that the card associations had 
engaged in an illegal tie by requiring merchants who accepted their credit cards also to accept 
their debit cards. After a district court found on summary judgment that the associations failed 
several of the major prongs of the Jefferson Parish test, the associations agreed to allow 
merchants to accept credit and debit separately and to pay $3 billion in damages.
67 And in March 
2004, the European Commission found that Microsoft committed a tying violation by failing to 
market a version of its Windows PC operating system without media player technology.
68 
The Chicago tsunami left tying law untouched. The courts often accepted the Chicago 
single monopoly profit theorem when it came to other allegations of monopoly leveraging, but 
not those that involved tying. Today, both the law and economics are best described as confused. 
There is little support among economists for the modified per se illegality standard applied in the 
United States and Europe,
69 since it does not correspond to any recognized theory that could be 
used to distinguish procompetitive from anticompetitive tying. Economic theory supports a rule-
of-reason approach to tying in which the potential anticompetitive effects and efficiency benefits 
of tying are carefully balanced given the facts of the case.
70 Yet, the discipline has not provided 
sharp tests for distinguishing anticompetitive from procompetitive tying.
71 
This is fertile ground for the neo-Chicago approach proposed in this Essay.  
 
                                                           
67 The payments are to be made over ten years, with a present discounted value of around $2.2 to $2.6 billion. The 
first author was a consultant to Visa U.S.A. in this matter. 
68 Commission Decision of 24.03.2004 (Case COMP/C-3/37.792 – Microsoft), available at  
http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/cases/decisions/37792/en.pdf. Microsoft has appealed this decision 
to the Court of First Instance (CFI). Microsoft v. Commission, Case T-201/04. Both authors made written and oral 
submissions to the Commission on behalf of Microsoft during the investigation as well as to the CFI on Microsoft’s 
motion for annulment. 
69 See, e.g., MOTTA, supra note 4, at 467-68; BORK, supra note 5, at 372-75. 
70 See also, David S. Evans, A. Jorge Padilla & Michael A. Salinger, A Pragmatic Approach to Identifying and 
Analyzing Legitimate Tying Cases,  in E UROPEAN  COMPETITION LAW ANNUAL  2003:  WHAT IS AN ABUSE OF A 
DOMINANT POSITION? (Hart Publishing, forthcoming). 
71 See, e.g., Whinston, supra note 29, at 855-56; Carlton & Waldman, supra note 31, at 215.  
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Prior Beliefs on Efficiencies 
Tying covers a range of business practices. Suppose there are two “components” A and 
B. Firms could provide these components as separate products A and B or they could combine 
them into a product AB. The combination could result because firms distribute A and B together, 
by firms inducing or requiring customers to take one to get the other, or by integrating the 
components together in ways that may make the combination more useful than the sum of the 
parts. 
As a technological matter, firms could offer A, B, and AB. Tying occurs in an economic 
sense when firms offer AB but do not offer both components A and B as separate choices. For 
example, if firms offer AB and B then A is tied to AB in the sense that customers can get A only 
if they buy AB. In Jefferson Parish, A was hospital surgical services and B was anesthesiology 
services. Patients could not bring in their own anesthesiologist. The hospital only offered the 
combination. In Tetra Pak II, A was carton packaging machines and B was the consumable 
cartons used.
72 Customers could only use cartons sold by the machine manufacturer. 
Many firms tie products in the economic sense of the term. Cars only come with air 
conditioners, mobile phones often only with ring tones, newspapers with arts sections, law 
degrees with courses on torts and contracts, computer operating systems always with internet-
communication protocols, and cameras with built-in flashes, just to give a few examples. In 
some cases, consumers can only get the bundle (newspapers) while in others they can get the 
bundle (mobile phones with ring tones) as well as a component (ring tones); sometimes the 
components are available from different suppliers than the bundle. Tying is so common that we 
tend not to notice it.  
There are obvious business reasons why firms would offer AB together. These include 
benefits of integration, economies of scope in distributing products, packaging cost savings, 
reduced transaction costs for businesses and consumers, and increased reliability for consumers. 
A firm that offers AB would offer A and B separately as well only if there were sufficient 
demand for it to cover the costs of doing so. If the fixed costs of offering B are high relative to 
the demand for B, a firm may decide to offer only AB and A. It therefore ties the purchase of B 
to the purchase of A. If consumers generally use A and B together, they may find it is cheaper 
                                                           




and more convenient to buy them together. Even if the fixed costs of offering A and B separately 
are modest, if there are few potential takers firms will only offer AB.
73  
Thus, while the economic evidence is limited, casual empiricism suggests that tying 
yields efficiencies. And the fact that this practice persists in competitive markets suggests that 
tying must result in lower prices or better quality. These sources of efficiency remain regardless 
of the degree of market power held by the firm that engages in tying. 
 
Prior Beliefs on Anticompetitive Intent and Effect 
Modern economic theory shows that, for given market structure, firms with a monopoly 
in A prefer that complementary product B be supplied at the lowest price possible. They will lose 
profit in the short run if they tie for anything other than efficiency reasons. They may still lose 
profit even if they can secure future profits by eliminating competition and deterring entry.
74 
Indeed, economic theorists have shown that a firm with monopoly power in the tying good A 
might have the incentives  and  ability to tie B anticompetitively only if the market for B is 
imperfectly competitive and tying deters potential competitors from entering the market for B or, 
alternatively, helps the monopolist to preserve its market power in A.
75 
A recent model by Dennis Carlton and Michael Waldman looks at the use of tying to 
protect an initially monopolized market from entry.
76 In their model, entry takes more time in 
one market than in the other and there are economies of scope from being in both markets. By 
reducing the profitability of being in one market only, tying may deter the potential entrant from 
entering in either or both markets. This model, and others similar to it, are useful because they 
help identify the necessary conditions that must hold for tying to be a competitive problem.
77 
However, they are not useful beyond that because it is not possible determine whether the 
assumptions and parameter values that would be sufficient for a tie to be welfare reducing hold 
as a practical matter. As Carlton and Waldman note, “[T]rying to turn the theoretical possibility 
for harm … into a prescriptive theory of antitrust enforcement is a difficult task. For example, 
                                                           
73 For a general discussion of the economic reasons for competitive tying, see Evans & Salinger, supra note 48. 
74 See Patrick Rey & Jean Tirole, A Primer on Foreclosure, in HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION: VOLUME 
III (forthcoming), at 47. 
75 See, e.g., Whinston supra note 29, Carlton & Waldman supra note 31, and Barry Nalebuff, Bundling, Yale ICF 
Working Paper #99-14 (1999). 
76 See Carlton & Waldman, supra note 31. 
77 Ahlborn, Evans and Padilla present a structured rule-of-reason test that is based on the necessary conditions for 
welfare-reducing tying found by Whinston and Carlton and Waldman. Evans et al., supra note 65, at 2.  
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the courts would have to weigh any potential efficiencies from the tie with possible losses due to 
foreclosure, which by itself is challenging due to the difficulty of measuring both the relevant 
efficiencies and the relevant losses.”
78 
Tying could be used, in principle, anticompetitively for one of the reasons described in 
the post-Chicago literature. Or it could be used nefariously in ways that economists have never 
imagined and that would come to light only by examining the facts of a particular case. 
However, a balanced reading of the post-Chicago literature indicates that firms with the ability to 
tie anticompetitively often do not have an incentive to do so, and those with the incentive often 
fail to have the power to cause harm to competition.
79 Our prior, therefore, is that in most 
occasions firms engaging in tying do so because it is efficient.  
 
Prior Belief on Error Costs 
Condemning procompetitive tying wipes out the efficiencies provided by tying in the 
case considered by the courts, increases the likelihood that the courts will condemn similar tying 
arrangements in other cases, and deters all firms from providing efficiencies through tying 
arrangements that subsequently seem vulnerable to legal challenge. Conversely, the courts’ 
failure to condemn anticompetitive tying increases the likelihood that a firm with monopoly 
power in one market will obtain a monopoly in an adjacent market or perpetuate its existing 
monopoly—in both cases restricting output and imposing the standard monopoly loss triangle on 
society. Moreover, other monopolies will not be deterred from engaging in similar 
anticompetitive behavior and this will lead to further losses.  
These considerations would not matter if courts could accurately distinguish between 
procompetitive and anticompetitive tying. Some limited insights into the likelihood and direction 
of errors comes from a recent study by Nalebuff and Majerus. They reviewed 11 tying cases in 
the United States and Europe and assessed whether the court reached the right judgment.
80 They 
did so starting from prior judgments that were more disposed towards viewing tying as 
                                                           
78 See Carlton & Waldman, supra note 31, at 215. Emphasis added. 
79 Rey et al., supra note 53.  
80 While the report nominally contains thirteen separate cases, two are about different aspects of the GE/Honeywell 
merger. Also, since one of the cases had not been decided when the report was completed, we exclude it, leaving 11 
cases. Barry Nalebuff & David Majerus, Bundling, Tying and Portfolio Effects: Part 2-Case Studies, DTI 
Economics Paper (February 2003). See also, David S. Evans, A. Jorge Padilla & Michael A. Salinger, supra note 70.  
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anticompetitive than we have argued for above.
81 Therefore, they are more likely to agree with a 
judgment of anticompetitive tying than would a reader who agrees with our prior beliefs on 
efficiencies and anticompetitive intent. Table 2 summarizes our understanding of their 
conclusions.  
This is a small, idiosyncratic, and subjective sample of cases. But these represent the 
leading cases in the United States and the European Union, and the judgments of these authors 
are instructive. There are no instances in which the courts found that an anticompetitive tying 
practice (by the authors’ judgment) was legal—that is, there were no false acquittals. There are 
three instances in which the courts found that a procompetitive tying practice (again by the 
authors’ judgment) was illegal—the rate of false convictions was therefore 27 percent.
82 
Assuming that each type of error is equally costly—denote the error cost per case by c—the 
expected error cost per case is 0.27c. 
The distribution of cases in Table 2 suggest that existing tying law is far from minimizing 
error costs.
83 Suppose we think about making the existing standard stricter. For example, suppose 
the likelihood of false convictions decreases by 20 percentage points while likelihood of false 
acquittals increases by 20 percentage points.
84 This will result in the following error cost matrix 
shown in Table 3. 
Errors are now made 22 percent (7 percent false acquittals plus 15 percent false 
convictions) of the time, so that the expected error cost per case is lower under the new standard, 
0.22c compared to 0.27c. This calculation is illustrative, and depends on a number of strong 
assumptions, but the basic intuition is that because most cases involve practices that are not 
                                                           
81 See generally, Barry Nalebuff & David Majerus, Bundling, Tying and Portfolio Effects: Part 1-Conceptual Issues, 
DTI Economics Paper (February 2003). See also, Barry Nalebuff, Bundling as an Entry Barrier, 119 Q.J. Econ. 159, 
183 (2004).  
82 Evans et al. argue that the actual percent of false convictions is probably much higher. Evans et al., supra note 70, 
at 16.  
83 Table 2 shows that of the 11 tying cases examined, 64 percent (7/11) are not harmful to competition and 36 
percent (4/11) are harmful. For a harmful act, the existing standard will correctly condemn 100 percent (4/4) of the 
time and falsely exonerate it 0 percent of the time (0/4). Similarly, for a harmful act, the existing modified per se 
illegality standard will correctly exonerate it 57 percent (4/7) of the time and falsely condemn it 43 percent of the 
time (3/7). 
84 As a simplifying assumption, suppose that the population of the litigated cases is unchanged, so that we still have 
64 percent of cases involving acts that are not harmful and 36 percent that are harmful. Moving to the stricter 
standard decreases the false conviction rate by 20 percentage points, from 43 percent to 23 percent, while at the 
same time, the false acquittal rate is increased by 20 percentage points, from 0 percent to 20 percent. The proportion 
of false acquittals out of total cases is now 7 percent (20 percent false acquittal rate times the 36 percent of harmless 
practices) and the proportion of false convictions is now 15 percent (23 percent false conviction rate times the 64 
percent of harmful practices).  
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harmful, we should err toward a standard that is more likely to result in false acquittals than false 
convictions. In addition, if we believed that the cost of false convictions was higher than the cost 
of false acquittals, as we suspect is likely, that would provide an additional reason to move 
toward an even stricter legal standard. 
 
Design of Legal Rules 
  Based on the prior belief stated above we can discard two extreme approaches for 
assessing tying practices. We can reject a per se illegality standard—the pre-Chicago approach—
on the grounds that tying is generally procompetitive. While the Nalebuff-Majerus work implies 
that two-thirds of all cases involve practices that are not harmful to competition, a per se 
illegality test would result in all of them being found illegal. We may also be able to reject, 
although less confidently, a per se legality standard—the Chicago School approach—on the 
grounds that tying could be used anticompetitively.
85 The Nalebuff-Majerus results imply that 
roughly one-third of cases involved anticompetitive ties. 
Two other possible standards are consistent with our approach to the design of legal rules 
for tying; they both impose significant hurdles to any finding of anticompetitive tying. A 
modified per se legality standard would presume that tying is procompetitive unless a plaintiff 
could present strong evidence that tying did not result in efficiencies but was used mainly to 
obtain or maintain a monopoly. Such evidence would require a significant demonstration that 
there was a causal link between the practice and a likely reduction in consumer welfare. Tying 
could be found illegal but probably only in “exceptional” circumstances.
86 A structured rule-of-
reason approach would employ a series of screens to focus only on those tying practices that 
could plausibly result in anticompetitive behavior. A plaintiff would need to show:  
 
1)  An anticompetitive effect is possible. A number of safe harbors would allow ties where 
they are unlikely to be anticompetitive, such as cases in which the defendant lacked 
                                                           
85 If the cost of false convictions were substantially higher than the cost of false acquittals, a per se legality rule 
might well be optimal under certain circumstances. With per se legality, the four cases of anticompetitive tying in 
Table 2 from the Nalebuff-Majerus analysis would become false acquittals (with no false convictions), compared to 
the three false convictions (with no false convictions) under prevailing legal standards. If false convictions were 
more than four-thirds as costly as false acquittals, then a per se legality standard would be preferable. We also note 
that a complete analysis would also have to consider a range of factors not included here, such as “errors” that do 
not get to court and the impact of changing legal standards on firms’ behavior. 
86 See Evans et al., supra note 65, at 65.   
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market power in the tying product. 
2)  An anticompetitive effect is plausible. There would have to be an economic theory of 
anticompetitive effect that fits the facts of the case.  
3)  Offsetting efficiency benefits, if present, are insubstantial.
87  
 
The Role of Efficiencies in Choosing Between Standards 
The choice between a structured rule-of-reason approach and modified per se legality is 
difficult and may depend on the class of tying arrangements under consideration. A modified per 
se legality rule will result in more false acquittals. The cost of false acquittals must be compared 
to the cost of the additional administrative costs of having to proceed through a series of complex 
screens as well as the costs of false convictions from applying that structured analysis. The 
structured rule of reason will prove most useful in extreme situations. That is, when it is clear 
after the first two screens that the alleged anticompetitive effects are highly implausible but there 
is convincing evidence supporting efficiency benefits. Or when the tie survives the two first 
screens and no efficiencies can be rigorously argued. Otherwise, it may prove inconclusive. 
The efficiency properties of tying arrangements should thus play a paramount role in the 
adoption of one standard or the other. Evans and Salinger find in their study of competitive tying 
that efficiencies are clearly present in the cases they examine—in part because the structure of 
the markets makes other explanations implausible—but are difficult to quantify and document.
88 
The same is likely to be true for tying practices engaged in by firms with market power. To 
minimize errors, they suggest allocating the burden of proof so that defendants have the burden 
of coming forward with an efficiency explanation for their practice, but plaintiffs bear the burden 
of showing that the efficiency explanation is not valid. 
Efficiencies are apparent in several leading tying cases, but with one exception their 
presence was largely ignored or rebuffed by the courts. In Jefferson Parish the District Court 
agreed with the defendant that the anesthesiology system in place was efficient because it 
                                                           
87 Id. at 56-64. 
88 The D.C. Circuit argued that the single-product test in Jefferson Parish was a proxy for determining whether there 
are efficiencies. The economics of tying explains why that is not correct. Consider a situation in which A is the tying 
product, B is the tied product, and AB is the combination. The Jefferson-Parish test looks at whether there is 
separate demand for B. That focuses on the wrong question. Tying is a violation because the firm did not offer the 
tying product A in addition to the tied combination AB. The question is therefore whether the failure to offer that 
separate choice (i.e., not offering A separately and allowing customers to supply their own B) is driven by efficiency 
reasons. Many competitive products would fail the single-product test because they consist of bundles (AB) for  
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provided 24-hour anesthesiology coverage and because having a closed group of physicians, 
nurses, and technicians provided for better standardization of procedures, monitoring of staff, 
and maintenance of equipment.
89 That seems like a plausible argument to us and consistent with 
transaction cost economics.
90 The Appeals Court rebuffed it, noting that anesthesiologists 
testified they would have been willing to provide 24-hour coverage without a contract and that 
the defendants had not adequately demonstrated that other alleged efficiencies existed and could 
not be achieved through less restrictive means.
91 The Supreme Court never seriously considered 
efficiencies and found for the hospital on the grounds that it lacked market power. By contrast, 
the Supreme Court recognized that it was probably efficient for the Times Picayune newspaper to 
require advertisers to place ads in both the morning and evening editions, because it saved 
having to reset the newspaper. Nevertheless, lack of market power in the advertising market was 
the main reason the Court ruled in favor of the newspaper.
92  
In the limited number of European cases on tying, there has yet to be a successful defense 
based on efficiencies.
93 For example, in Hilti, the defendant argued that the reliability and safety 
of its nail gun system was enhanced by the ties and other restriction connecting its nail guns, nail 
cartridges, and nails used in the system.
94 The European Commission rejected Hilti’s justification 
on the grounds that there are less restrictive actions that would satisfy those objectives.
95 It is 
hard to know from the record, since the discussion of efficiencies is not well developed, whether 
the Commission was correct. 
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
 
Our proposed approach provides a unifying framework for evaluating unilateral practices. 
It draws on years of research by both Chicago and post-Chicago scholars and is consistent with 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
which components or spare parts are available separately. 
89 Hyde v. Jefferson Parish Dist. No. 2, 513 F. Supp 532, 540 (D. La. 1981), rev’d, 686 F.2d 286 (5th Cir. 
1982), rev’d, 466 U.S. 2 (1984). 
90 For a discussion of the transaction cost economics of firms,  see Joskow, supra note 7;  DON  WALDMAN  & 
ELIZABETH JENSEN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION: THEORY AND PRACTICE (1998), at 54-57. 
91 Hyde v. Jefferson Parish Dist. No. 2, 686 F.2d 286, 292 (5th Cir. 1982). 
92 Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 611-12 (1953).  
93 See Ahlborn et al., supra note 60, at 31. 
94 Commission Decision of 22 December 1987 (IV/30.787 and 31.488 - Eurofix-Bauco v. Hilti), available at 
http://europa.eu.int/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexplus!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=en&numdoc=388D0138. 
95 Id. at ¶88.  
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some of the seminal court decisions in the United States and the European Union. While this 
approach imposes some coherence on antitrust law, it also provides some flexibility. First, it does 
not require that the same form of rule apply to every practice. Prior judgments on the 
procompetitive and anticompetitive uses of a practice can influence the choice of rule and the 
screens that are used to minimize error costs. Second, the same analytical framework could be 
used for different prior beliefs on the nature of socially beneficial competition. Indeed, this 
approach provides a rigorous way of analyzing whether and to what extent antitrust rules should 
vary across jurisdictions, practices and time. 
Economics could provide more help in applying this approach. It is unrealistic to ask 
economics to provide off-the-shelf guidance for the myriad fact patterns that one encounters in 
real-life antitrust. But economics itself needs to move towards theory and empirics that can 
separate the good from the bad for competition. Unfortunately, although the game-theoretic 
approach embraced by the post-Chicago literature is valuable for helping to understand business 
practices, it has yet to demonstrate that it is capable of yielding what we would call 
“identification theorems:” useful descriptions of the circumstances determining whether a 
practice is procompetitive or anticompetitive. Kovacic and Shapiro conclude their survey of the 
first century of antitrust by noting, “The availability of new data sources like electronic point-of-
purchase data, the refinement of flexible game-theoretic models, and the new emphasis on 
innovation assures that robust arguments over the proper content of competition policy will 
flourish in the 21st century.”
96 In the four years since this was written, we have seen very little 
progress in the theoretical literature that would help competition authorities or courts separate 
procompetitive from anticompetitive behavior.
97 Encouragingly, one of the most important 
developments in the scholarly literature on modern industrial organization is the increased effort 
to bring facts—by way of case studies or rigorous econometric analyses—to bear on theory.
98 
                                                           
96 Kovacic & Shapiro, supra note 8, at 58-59. 
97 As noted by Kyle Bagwell and Asher Wolinsky in a recent paper, “So industrial organization has a new 
language/discipline [game theory] and perhaps a superior one to what it had before, but has this language generated 
new insights to the substance of industrial organization? By taking a very broad view, one might argued that it has 
not. … In particular, has the game theoretic framework delivered a new class of models that consistently facilitates 
better quantitative predictions than what would have been available in its absence? …Here, we note that important 
new empirical work in industrial organization makes extensive use of game theoretic models, but we also caution 
that there is as yet no simple basis to conclude that the game theoretic approach provides consistently superior 
predictions.” Kyle Bagwell & Asher Wolinsky, Game Theory and Industrial Organization, Columbia University 
Department of Economics: Discussion Paper No. 9900-03 (April 2000), at 40-41, at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=239431. 
98 See, e.g., Ariel Pakes, A Framework for Applied Dynamic Analysis in I.O., NBER Working Paper Series 8024, at  
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The neo-Chicago approach described in this paper points to a research agenda for 
economists that could help provide practical information to the courts and regulatory authorities 
for the purpose of developing sound rules. Economists need to better understand the extent to 
which competitive (non-dominant) firms engage in the kinds of business practices that become 
suspect when they are used by firms with market power and why competitive firms engage in 
these practices.
99 Doing so will help determine whether there are plausible efficiencies from 
those practices as well as informing judgments about the likely importance of those efficiencies. 
More generally, economists need to develop theory and empirics that can help assess the cost and 
likelihood of errors (of both kinds) for assessing unilateral practices. As economics evolves, it is 
possible that it will develop more identification theorems that can be used to separate 
procompetitive from anticompetitive practices. In the meantime, economics needs to help courts 
and regulatory authorities do the best they can to sort through complex business practices and 
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Organization, Keynote Address to the International Industrial Organization Conference, Boston (April 2003), at 
http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/pakes/papers.html.  
99 See Evans & Salinger, supra note 48; David S. Evans & Michael A. Salinger, The Role of Cost in Determining 
When Firms Offer Bundles and Ties, Working Paper, May 2004; David S. Evans & Michael Salinger, An Empirical 
Analysis of Bundling and Tying, Over-The-Counter Pain Relief and Cold Medicine, Prepared for CESifo Summer 
















Table 1. Possible Errors in the Antitrust Assessment of Business 
Practices 
  Illegal Legal 
Harmful to 
competition 
Percent of cases correctly 
condemning anticompetitive 
practices 
Percent of cases falsely 
absolving legitimate 
practices 
Not harmful to 
competition 
Percent of cases falsely 
condemning legitimate 
practices  





Table 2. A Decision-Theoretic Perspective on Nalebuff and 
Majerus (2003) 
  Illegal Legal 
Harmful to competition  Four (36%)  None (0%) 
Not harmful to 





Table 3. Error Costs Under a Stricter Legal Standard 
  Illegal Legal 
Harmful to competition  29%  7% 
Not harmful to 
competition  15%  49% 
 